The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe, 1964-1994 by Stanley Hoffmann

Author:Stanley Hoffmann [Hoffmann, Stanley]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Europe, Western
ISBN: 9780813323817
Google: Xs-PxwEACAAJ
Goodreads: 13428066
Publisher: Westview Press
Published: 1995-02-12T00:00:00+00:00

Future

A. Any discussion of alternatives must either take the form of a series of scenarios covering a wide range of possibilities (cf. the Kahn-Wiener book on the year 2000)9 or else be based on definite assumptions that limit that range by ruling out either "far out" hypotheses or (alas) more likely ones, but of a kind that make forecasting too difficult. I will adopt the second method. (The first would require a volume and still be of dubious usefulness.)

1. My first assumption is the continuing importance of Western Europe to the United States. It is sufficiently great to justify that much overworked expression, a "special relationship." The three ranges of common interests postulated by the United States since the late 40s are still present.

a. In die realm of military security, I would argue that the interest of the United States remains in the existence of a Western Europe that is both safe from military attack or nibbling from the East, and sufficiently confident in its capacity to deter such encroachment not to be tempted to glide into "Finlandization," i.e., into a policy of accommodation to Soviet demands (for instance, a veto of any extension of EEC activities in diplomacy or defense, always opposed by Moscow). It has been argued that the physical safety of the United States would not be threatened by the "loss" of Western Europe. But clearly the complex balance of world power, which does not consist of the nuclear strategic stalemate alone, would be imperiled (far more than it was by the Soviet move in Cuba in 1962). Besides, the main concern of a great power, after physical security, is influence. Surely this is what the massive build-up of Soviet might is aiming at: the expansion of Soviet influence and the eventual neutralization of Western Europe as an actor in world affairs. The very reason why Western Europe remains a major, if currently inaccessible, prize for Moscow explains why it remains a crucial stake for the United States.

b. What is more, military safety and the political self-confidence it breeds are closely connected with economic orientation. A "Finlandized" Western Europe could be prosperous (Finland is). But would it remain part of the "open" international economy, would it accord shelters, springboards, and good treatment to United States investments, dollars, goods, and services? Americas original interest in Western Europe's recovery has been transformed into an interest in Western Europe's prosperity and financial solvency, because of the very strength of the links of trade and financial involvement that make of the North Atlantic (if you'll pardon the expression) a coprosperity sphere. The political base of this "community" of advanced capitalism is the security link established in the late 40s. Quasi -instinctively, this is what NATO's European members understood when they decided to follow Kissinger's oil strategy.

c. On the new global issues that have, along with oil, come to the fore, as well as on what might be called the "old" global issues (such as East-West relations or the Arab-Israeli dispute, which

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